Reflections on Bertrand Russell's 'The Problems of Philosophy'
'The Problems of Philosophy' is one the earliest and most popular books of the British analytic philosopher, Bertrand Russell. It's a small book, but one asking the most difficult questions of philosophy and loaded with insight and wit. Russell was one of the leading philosophers of the twentieth century. He sought to reconcile philosophy and science, drawing heavily from his expertise in logic and mathematics. Russell devoted a great deal of thought to the subject of knowledge and to the question, 'What, if anything, do we truly know?' As a rigorous analyst he launched this inquiry with a close examination of the fundamentals of human experience, seeking to find a solid basis upon which to build a theory of knowledge. In so doing, Russell was tackling one of the oldest, most bedeviling problems of philosophy: 'What exactly is our relationship with the external world?" It has proven a difficult problem not only for philosophy, but one which impinges heavily on both science and religion.
Russell, like his rationalist predecessor Rene Descartes, begins by putting everything into doubt. He asks, 'Of what, if anything, can I be absolutely certain.' Descartes' famous answer to this question was, 'I think, therefore I am'. Russell however is not so sure of Descartes' 'I am', since when he looks into his own experience he cannot find it. In 'The Problems of Philosophy' he remarks: 'When we try to look into ourselves we always seem to come upon some particular thought or feeling, and not upon the "I" which has the thought or feeling.'* Russell does not doubt that there is an experiencing 'I', but he doubts Descartes' implicit assumption of a more or less permanent 'I' which is thinking. Russell is not at all certain that the 'I' who is aware of a specific brown table on two different occasions is, in any absolute sense, the same person. This notion of an impermanent or momentary self is not exclusive to Russell, but is expressly affirmed by some Buddhist schools of thought. What Russell does find and cannot doubt when examining his own experience is what he calls 'sense-data', specifically colours, sounds, sensations, tastes and smells. He notes that the sense-data which make up his brown table are directly intuited and immediately present. The brown patch is a brown patch, neither more nor less: it is what it is. The table, however, is another matter. It is a composite of sense-data representing something which supposedly continues to exist regardless of whether the observer is observing it or not. The various sense-data themselves are an appearance which cannot be questioned and what they represent as the table is also an appearance which cannot be doubted. What is open to doubt, however, is whether the appearance of the table is anything more than an appearance; in other words, whether the table in itself has a material existence independent of its appearance to an observer. Of course, common sense says it does. The person who every day goes into his study, sits down and writes at the same brown table will never seriously doubt that his table is real or that it exists independently of himself. Proving this, however, is not an easy matter and, in fact, there is no proof that any object truly exists beyond its appearance, although there are strong arguments in favor of inferring that it does.
Russell noted that sense-data, although indubitable, are private to ourselves. I know what the table I am observing looks and feels like, but how can I know that it looks and feels exactly the same to another observer? Russell would agree that there is no way of knowing this with any absolute certainty.
* The Problems of Philosophy pg. 50
Russell relied principally on induction (the process of inferring something about the unknown from the known) and recognized that human beings have no choice but to lean heavily on inference as the basis for a great many of the decisions and actions life forces them to take. Russell inferred that there is an 'external' world which is reflected in our direct experience, and he endeavored to establish principles for gaining an understanding of how it works and how we relate with it. For example, he would acknowledge that the 'space' we see between the objects of our direct experience, is a private space known only by the seer. However, he also argued that there is a 'public space' which can be inferred and which human beings for all practical purposes can agree upon. Thus, the space I see which is private to me, and the space you see which is private to you, reveals a public space that we and others share. He felt that even though we can only 'infer' a public space, the evidence is sufficiently strong to accept that for all practical purposes public space is a reality. Russell was wise enough to accept that there are limits to human knowledge and sufficiently pragmatic to accept that some inferences are more 'solid' than others and therefore worthy of being acted upon. For Russell, a self-proclaimed realist, the evidence was overwhelmingly in favour of a real public space that exists independently of our private experience and he felt that this assumption must be accepted in the interests of our individual and common good. For, if we do not agree that we share a public space, then on what basis will we be able to engage cooperatively and co-manage our personal and public affairs?
In his own lifetime, Russell was often condemned for his atheism and liberal views. Yet, in spite of his refusal to accept the traditional belief in a 'creator God' or to assign any significant value to religion, he was a profoundly spiritual man. He was passionately motivated to understand the nature of reality, as well as the limits to human knowledge, and deeply committed to the welfare of humanity -- so much so that on more than one occasion he was imprisoned for challenging authority on pressing issues of justice and peace.
Some important quotes from Russell's, 'The Problems of Philosophy' with commentary
"The general principles of science, such as the belief in the reign of law, and the belief that every event must have a cause, are as completely dependent upon the inductive principle as are the beliefs of daily life. All such general principles are believed because mankind has innumerable instances of their truth and no instances of their falsehood. But this affords no evidence for their truth, unless the inductive principle is assumed." p. 69
"The inductive principle has less self-evidence than some of the other principles of logic, such as 'what follows from a true premiss must be true'." p. 117
If the theory of causality is true, i.e. -- that every event must have a cause, then there must be a first cause of the physical universe. Not to assume a first, primordial cause would force us to posit an infinite regression, i.e. -- a cause of the first cause, a cause of the cause of the first cause, etc. Let us call the first, primordial cause, 'Source'. From Source a physical universe of causal events has arisen. Source cannot itself be an event, since something else would have necessarily caused the event. Source cannot stand in a causal relation with any specific event arising or manifesting or appearing, including the event called 'the physical universe'. This raises a serious question: 'If Source, which is not itself caused, does not cause something to happen then what is the initiating impetus?' Something must have happened to make something happen: what triggered the first happening? We are caught in a paradox to which the only plausible answer is that causality itself not a fact of the external world, but rather a conceptual creation of the intellect devised to impose some form of coherence upon the deluge of sense-data to which the experiencing mind is subjected. Furthermore, any causally related series of events must involve time. If we assume that cause and effect is a true fact of the external world, then we must assume that time is also real. But is time real? The answer to this, as it pertains to the external world is 'no'. Time, like the notion of cause and effect, must be a creation of the mind. These two mental creations -- causality and time -- are necessary for ordering the plethora of appearances appearing in the mind. We cannot validly make the leap of assuming that an external world, which is being revealed to us in the form of appearances, is itself governed by the principles of time and causality.
The problem with the term 'first cause' is that it is inherently self-contradictory. Any cause presupposes a before and an after, so when we say 'first cause' we must assume something before the first cause -- i.e., something must have caused the first cause. The question always arises, 'How did the first cause come into being?' or 'What happened before the Big Bang?' It's clear that there can be no first cause and, by extension, no final effect. Thus, there is no beginning and no end. Causality is a fiction created to make sense of what appears to be a 'cause and effect' universe. The term, 'Source' is a better choice because it does not imply an event, whereas first cause implies an initiating impetus.
The physical universe, which includes our human body and its internal manifestations (feelings, emotions, sensations, desires, etc), appears to an observer. The observer is that to which the physical universe reveals itself. Subjectively, this observer is termed the 'self'. This self is the conscious witness of all that is appearing. The self is also that which is conscious of the physical body and its internal manifestations. Because of the relationship of the body to its surrounding environment, the impression is created that the conscious witness is somehow located inside of the physical body. In Western philosophy and theology various theories have been created to explain the exact nature of this localized, conscious self, but none of them have proven satisfactory.
Russell on knowledge by acquaintance:
"...Russell thought that material objects were real -- although, as we shall see, he didn't think we were acquainted with any of them." p. xii, introduction
"...whatever may be the object of acquaintance, even in dreams and hallucinations, there is no error involved so long as we do not go beyond the immediate object: error can only arise when we regard the immediate object, i.e., the sense-datum, as the mark of some physical object." p. 110
Russell's view is that we are acquainted only with sense-data, of which material objects -- i.e., the object perceived, the physical senses and the human nervous system, are the cause. In other words, we have direct experience of sense-data, but only indirect experience of the objects the sense-data refer to. The object itself is not directly accessible, but is a 'thing-in-itself' which is known only inferentially via the physical senses.
"...we saw that...knowledge of physical objects, as opposed to sense-data, is only obtained by an inference, and that they are not things with which we are acquainted. Hence we can never know any proposition of the form 'this is a physical object', where 'this' is something immediately known. It follows that all our knowledge concerning physical objects is such that no actual instance is given. We can give instances of the associated sense-data, but we cannot give instances of the actual physical objects." p. 108
From the quotation above, it follows that relations among objects and events are also 'not things with which we are acquainted' and are therefore 'only attained by an inference'.
"Whatever we are acquainted with must be something; we may draw wrong inferences from our acquaintance, but the acquaintance itself cannot be deceptive. Thus there is no dualism as regards acquaintance. But as regards knowledge of truths, there is a dualism." p. 119
Russell on Immanuel Kant's 'thing-in-itself':
"Kant's 'thing-in-itself' is identical in definition with the physical object, namely, it is the cause of sensations. In the properties deduced from the definition it is not identical, since Kant held [the view]...that we can know that none of the categories are applicable to the 'thing in itself'." p. 86, footnote
Q: From where do the 'categories' arise and to what are they applicable?
A: They arise from the internal organ. The perceived object tells us something about both the external world and the internal organ (our biological faculties of experience). Even Russell's 'sense-data' is a function of the relationship between the internal organ and the external world. Of course, this is an inference, not a fact.
All perceived properties of an object, plus the way they are configured, involve the internal organ. The raw sense-data arise as a function of the interaction, via the senses, of the internal organ with the environment. The catagories are applicable to the sense-data and their configuration as objects and events. The catagories do not apply to things-in-themselves, but rather their manifestation in consciousness.
There is a witnessing consciousness to both empirical and a priori knowledge. Something known a priori (e.g., two plus two equals four) implies a knowledge which is accessible to the thinking apparatus (internal organ), irrespective of any contact of the senses with the outer world. However, without external stimulus it is probable that the thinking apparatus would lie dormant and never concieve of an a priori truth such as 2 + 2 = 4.
An object/event reveals something about the energetic relationship between the 'thing-in-itself' and the nervous system -- but how do we disentangle the two? The phenomenon perceived reveals something about both the 'thing-in-itself' and the internal organ.
Ramana Maharshi, who equates the witnessing consciousness or Self with 'being-consciousness' (Siva, or God), expresses the non-dualist view that the Self is both the source and the observer of all this. He comments: 'Siva (God) is the being assuming all forms and the consciousness seeing them. That is to say, Siva is the background underlying both the object and subject. Everything has its being in Siva and because of Siva.' Here Siva, consciousness and the Self are not in any sense separate from one another -- they are One; duality is an appearance only (as is time, as is causality).
Russell on facts and propositions:
"...facts and propositions...are...complexes with universals* and particulars as constituents. Facts constitute the way thing are; particulars having qualities and standing in various relations to one another. Propositions are the possibilities we grasp in thought; they represent particulars as having qualities and standing in relations. True propositions correspond to the facts." p. xii & xiii, introduction
* universals: the general (e.g. the colour red) as opposed to the particular (e.g. a specific red object).
For many millennia it was a fact that the sun literally 'rose' at sunrise. It was a fact that everyone agreed upon. The propositions of the early astronomer Ptolmey corresponded to this fact and were thus held to be true. In this case the fact was not 'the way things actually are', but rather 'the way things appear to be.' Ptolmey's proposition corresponded with the known facts for many centuries, but as anomalies began to show up as a result of further research (aided by the invention of the telescope) the facts changed and Ptolmey's proposition failed. Thus, while facts may be respected, they must always be held with a degree of tentativeness.
Fact: the sun rises every morning on one horizon and sets every evening on a different horizon. This is directly observable whenever there is no cloud-cover.
Proposition: the sun revolves around the earth. This proposition corresponds with the above fact. The proposition, 'I propose that the sun revolves around the earth' does not equate with 'I believe in the proposition that the sun revolves around the earth'. The former entertains some tentativeness, while the latter asserts certitude. Propositions can always turn out to be wrong or incomplete, no matter how overwhelming the immediate evidence.
A proposition is a possibility. The value of propositions is that they invite further investigation. Propositions are an important aspect of research, especially when research on a specific topic involves two or more people.
The way in which a group of sense-datum are configured -- i.e., related, is definitely mental. Consider the famous pencil sketch which can appear either as a woman's head and shoulders or as a human skull, but never both at the same time. In this instance we have two apparent 'facts' which seem to contradict one another. Any impression or interpretation is a 'fact of experience', but this does not guarantee that it is a fact of the external world, since it is subject to contradiction by further 'facts of experience'. The impression that the sun revolves around the earth was held to be a self-evident 'fact of experience' by humanity for a very long time, yet it ultimately proved to be wrong.
"For Russell, however, sense-data and some universals are beyond doubt, because we are acquainted with them (he is inclined to include the self too, but isn't quite sure). We know of other objects via these objects. The table is known by description*, as the 'cause' of the sense-data with which Russell is acquainted. That is, we take sense-data to be 'signs' of physical objects. And we take the features of our sense-data, to be signs of the features of the physical object." p. xxiv, introduction
* description: Since we can't know an object directly, but only indirectly through the specific sense-data associated with that object, all we can say is that the sense-data give us a 'description' of the object. It is the description that we know and not the object as it is in itself.
"The real table, if there is one, is not 'immediately' known to us at all, but must be an inference from what is immediately known." p. 11
"Here we have...one of the distinctions that cause the most trouble in philosophy -- the distinction between 'appearance' and 'reality'." p. 9
The appearance of a coiled snake at dusk may not be an accurate representation of reality. The apparent snake may in fact be something else (e.g., a coiled rope -- another appearance). This second possible appearance could also be inaccurate and could be a third thing, for example, a cow paddy. What is the true nature of the reality represented by these three different appearances? Can we ever be absolutely certain that we've got it right? If we are convinced, how can we prove that our certainty is incontestable? Russell would argue that through consistency and coherence we can infer the probable truth of something concerning the external world. But he would also insist that an inference is never a proof.
Russell on universals, particulars and knowledge by description:
"...it is necessary to guard against the supposition that whatever we can be acquainted with must be something particular and existent. Awareness of universals is called 'conceiving', and a universal of which we are aware is called a 'concept'." p. 52
The concept of 'red', for example, is a 'universal'. A specific patch of red associated with an object is a 'particular'.
"In logic...where we are concerned not merely with what does exist, but with whatever might or could exist, no reference to actual particulars is involved." p. 56
"...all knowledge of truths...demands acquaintance with things which are of a...different character from sense-data, the things which are sometimes called 'abstract ideas' but which we shall call 'universals'" p. 48
Universals are intellectual in nature. 'Sensible qualities' are similarities, not absolute equalities (e.g., patches of white which may vary slightly in colour tone). The abstraction of 'white' from 'patches of white' is intellectual, not sensorial.
"The chief importance of knowledge by description is that it enables us to pass beyond the limits of our private experience." p. 59
Knowledge by description is something human beings share with one another through language and other forms of communication. On the basis of this sharing we develop a common knowledge of the way things are. This common knowledge is 'public', as opposed to 'private'. Thus, groups of human beings have collective agreements about the nature of things. These agreements allow us to function together with relative social cohesion and harmony. The writing of laws and constitutions are examples of a group endeavor to come up with clear and unequivocal agreements concerning the management of the affairs of a society or nation. 'Public' agreements extend beyond governance and include science, art, environment, health, family, moral and ethical values, etc.
Russell on memory:
"...immediate knowledge by memory is the source of all our knowledge concerning the past..." p. 49
Russell on truth:
"...truth consists in some form of correspondence between belief and fact. It is, however, (difficult) to discover a form of correspondence to which there are no irrefutable objections." p. 121
"...coherence as the definition of truth fails because there is no proof that there can be only one coherent system." p. 122
"...the laws of logic supply the...framework within which the test of coherence applies, and they themselves cannot be established by this test." p. 123
"All arithmetic...can be deduced from the general principles of logic, yet the simple propositions of arithmetic, such as 'two and two are four', are just as self-evident as the principles of logic." p. 112
"...if there is any truth in our arithmetical beliefs, they must apply to things equally whether we think of them or not. Two physical objects and two other physical objects must make four physical objects, even if physical objects cannot be experienced." p. 87
"...whatever self-evident truths may be obtained from our senses must be different from the sense-data from which they are attained." p. 114
Is there any true 'discreteness' in the physical universe? Is the notion of discrete objects and events a function of the internal organ alone? For example, if we put ice-cubes in warm water, do we still have discrete, distinct, and clearly defined objects called 'ice-cubes'? Or, do we merely have a medium in which there is some 'lumpiness', but no discrete objects? If the latter is true, could this be extended to apply to the entire universe?
If there are discrete 'things-in-themselves', then the a priori truth that '2 + 2 = 4', would apply to them. If only mental phenomena have discreteness, and not the physical objects and events which make up the universe, then not only is '2 + 2 = 4' applicable only to those mental phenomena, but so is the idea of discreteness. Neither would apply in an external world where discrete objects and events do not really exist (which is probably the case).
Within any mass of sense-data, the intellect or discriminative faculty has the capacity to apprehend structure. Elementary structure always involves relatedness among the particulars of any group of sense-data, thus the perception of (perceived) discrete objects such as apples. This is a first level of abstraction. The intellect can further group these structures into categories based on features such colour, e.g., red apples, green apples and yellow apples. This is a second level of abstraction. A third level of abstraction would be to determine that the four red, three green and six yellow apples make a total of 13 apples. A further forth level of abstraction would be to drop all references to name (apple) and colour (red, green or yellow) and simply state the universal, '4 + 3 + 6 = 13'. All of this is a function of the power of the intellect to apprehend or abstract structure from the raw datum of experience. The forth level of abstraction has no direct relationship with sense-data, unlike levels one, two and three.
Now, the question is: Is the power of the intellect simply producing elegant 'truths' about fictitious things, or are these abstractions revealing something about the structure of a physical universe which exists independently of both the intellect and our immediate, private experience? Also, are there really any truly discrete events in the physical universe or, are events only 'apparently' discrete and, in fact, superimposed by the intellect on a universe in which discreteness does not exist? Is our world of separate objects and events merely a creation of our mental apparatus and not a true reflection of reality?
Russell argues that a theory of truth must be one which:
"1. allows truth to have an opposite, namely falsehood,
2. makes truth a property of beliefs, but
3. makes it a property wholly dependent upon the relation of
the belief to outside things." p. 123
Whatever I know (directly and without doubt) is private and experiential. That is to say, I know whatever is presented in experience and as experience to be self-evident. What I do not know with absolute certainty is whether what I know privately corresponds to something outside of my experience or whether, in fact, there is anything that exists outside of my experience.
I have direct, immediate acquaintance with the Self as it is presented in experience. I do not experience the Self as a 'thing-in-itself' -- i.e., revealing itself through sensation, but rather as a 'being-consciousness' which I am. In this direct Self-acquaintance, the body-mind and its aggregates either simply disappear or are perceived as adjuncts which adhere to, but are not, the Self.
Russell does not consider the hypothesis of an independent 'thing-in-itself', standing behind and separate from the appearance, to be either valid or provable.
Russell on matter and light:
"The collection of all physical objects is called 'matter'. Thus our two questions may be re-stated as follows: (1) Is there any such thing as matter? (2) If so, what is its nature?" p. 12
"...physical objects cannot be quite like our sense-data, but may be regarded as 'causing' our sensations"
'The Problems of Philosophy' is one the earliest and most popular books of the British analytic philosopher, Bertrand Russell. It's a small book, but one asking the most difficult questions of philosophy and loaded with insight and wit. Russell was one of the leading philosophers of the twentieth century. He sought to reconcile philosophy and science, drawing heavily from his expertise in logic and mathematics. Russell devoted a great deal of thought to the subject of knowledge and to the question, 'What, if anything, do we truly know?' As a rigorous analyst he launched this inquiry with a close examination of the fundamentals of human experience, seeking to find a solid basis upon which to build a theory of knowledge. In so doing, Russell was tackling one of the oldest, most bedeviling problems of philosophy: 'What exactly is our relationship with the external world?" It has proven a difficult problem not only for philosophy, but one which impinges heavily on both science and religion.
Russell, like his rationalist predecessor Rene Descartes, begins by putting everything into doubt. He asks, 'Of what, if anything, can I be absolutely certain.' Descartes' famous answer to this question was, 'I think, therefore I am'. Russell however is not so sure of Descartes' 'I am', since when he looks into his own experience he cannot find it. In 'The Problems of Philosophy' he remarks: 'When we try to look into ourselves we always seem to come upon some particular thought or feeling, and not upon the "I" which has the thought or feeling.'* Russell does not doubt that there is an experiencing 'I', but he doubts Descartes' implicit assumption of a more or less permanent 'I' which is thinking. Russell is not at all certain that the 'I' who is aware of a specific brown table on two different occasions is, in any absolute sense, the same person. This notion of an impermanent or momentary self is not exclusive to Russell, but is expressly affirmed by some Buddhist schools of thought. What Russell does find and cannot doubt when examining his own experience is what he calls 'sense-data', specifically colours, sounds, sensations, tastes and smells. He notes that the sense-data which make up his brown table are directly intuited and immediately present. The brown patch is a brown patch, neither more nor less: it is what it is. The table, however, is another matter. It is a composite of sense-data representing something which supposedly continues to exist regardless of whether the observer is observing it or not. The various sense-data themselves are an appearance which cannot be questioned and what they represent as the table is also an appearance which cannot be doubted. What is open to doubt, however, is whether the appearance of the table is anything more than an appearance; in other words, whether the table in itself has a material existence independent of its appearance to an observer. Of course, common sense says it does. The person who every day goes into his study, sits down and writes at the same brown table will never seriously doubt that his table is real or that it exists independently of himself. Proving this, however, is not an easy matter and, in fact, there is no proof that any object truly exists beyond its appearance, although there are strong arguments in favor of inferring that it does.
Russell noted that sense-data, although indubitable, are private to ourselves. I know what the table I am observing looks and feels like, but how can I know that it looks and feels exactly the same to another observer? Russell would agree that there is no way of knowing this with any absolute certainty.
* The Problems of Philosophy pg. 50
Russell relied principally on induction (the process of inferring something about the unknown from the known) and recognized that human beings have no choice but to lean heavily on inference as the basis for a great many of the decisions and actions life forces them to take. Russell inferred that there is an 'external' world which is reflected in our direct experience, and he endeavored to establish principles for gaining an understanding of how it works and how we relate with it. For example, he would acknowledge that the 'space' we see between the objects of our direct experience, is a private space known only by the seer. However, he also argued that there is a 'public space' which can be inferred and which human beings for all practical purposes can agree upon. Thus, the space I see which is private to me, and the space you see which is private to you, reveals a public space that we and others share. He felt that even though we can only 'infer' a public space, the evidence is sufficiently strong to accept that for all practical purposes public space is a reality. Russell was wise enough to accept that there are limits to human knowledge and sufficiently pragmatic to accept that some inferences are more 'solid' than others and therefore worthy of being acted upon. For Russell, a self-proclaimed realist, the evidence was overwhelmingly in favour of a real public space that exists independently of our private experience and he felt that this assumption must be accepted in the interests of our individual and common good. For, if we do not agree that we share a public space, then on what basis will we be able to engage cooperatively and co-manage our personal and public affairs?
In his own lifetime, Russell was often condemned for his atheism and liberal views. Yet, in spite of his refusal to accept the traditional belief in a 'creator God' or to assign any significant value to religion, he was a profoundly spiritual man. He was passionately motivated to understand the nature of reality, as well as the limits to human knowledge, and deeply committed to the welfare of humanity -- so much so that on more than one occasion he was imprisoned for challenging authority on pressing issues of justice and peace.
Some important quotes from Russell's, 'The Problems of Philosophy' with commentary
"The general principles of science, such as the belief in the reign of law, and the belief that every event must have a cause, are as completely dependent upon the inductive principle as are the beliefs of daily life. All such general principles are believed because mankind has innumerable instances of their truth and no instances of their falsehood. But this affords no evidence for their truth, unless the inductive principle is assumed." p. 69
"The inductive principle has less self-evidence than some of the other principles of logic, such as 'what follows from a true premiss must be true'." p. 117
If the theory of causality is true, i.e. -- that every event must have a cause, then there must be a first cause of the physical universe. Not to assume a first, primordial cause would force us to posit an infinite regression, i.e. -- a cause of the first cause, a cause of the cause of the first cause, etc. Let us call the first, primordial cause, 'Source'. From Source a physical universe of causal events has arisen. Source cannot itself be an event, since something else would have necessarily caused the event. Source cannot stand in a causal relation with any specific event arising or manifesting or appearing, including the event called 'the physical universe'. This raises a serious question: 'If Source, which is not itself caused, does not cause something to happen then what is the initiating impetus?' Something must have happened to make something happen: what triggered the first happening? We are caught in a paradox to which the only plausible answer is that causality itself not a fact of the external world, but rather a conceptual creation of the intellect devised to impose some form of coherence upon the deluge of sense-data to which the experiencing mind is subjected. Furthermore, any causally related series of events must involve time. If we assume that cause and effect is a true fact of the external world, then we must assume that time is also real. But is time real? The answer to this, as it pertains to the external world is 'no'. Time, like the notion of cause and effect, must be a creation of the mind. These two mental creations -- causality and time -- are necessary for ordering the plethora of appearances appearing in the mind. We cannot validly make the leap of assuming that an external world, which is being revealed to us in the form of appearances, is itself governed by the principles of time and causality.
The problem with the term 'first cause' is that it is inherently self-contradictory. Any cause presupposes a before and an after, so when we say 'first cause' we must assume something before the first cause -- i.e., something must have caused the first cause. The question always arises, 'How did the first cause come into being?' or 'What happened before the Big Bang?' It's clear that there can be no first cause and, by extension, no final effect. Thus, there is no beginning and no end. Causality is a fiction created to make sense of what appears to be a 'cause and effect' universe. The term, 'Source' is a better choice because it does not imply an event, whereas first cause implies an initiating impetus.
The physical universe, which includes our human body and its internal manifestations (feelings, emotions, sensations, desires, etc), appears to an observer. The observer is that to which the physical universe reveals itself. Subjectively, this observer is termed the 'self'. This self is the conscious witness of all that is appearing. The self is also that which is conscious of the physical body and its internal manifestations. Because of the relationship of the body to its surrounding environment, the impression is created that the conscious witness is somehow located inside of the physical body. In Western philosophy and theology various theories have been created to explain the exact nature of this localized, conscious self, but none of them have proven satisfactory.
Russell on knowledge by acquaintance:
"...Russell thought that material objects were real -- although, as we shall see, he didn't think we were acquainted with any of them." p. xii, introduction
"...whatever may be the object of acquaintance, even in dreams and hallucinations, there is no error involved so long as we do not go beyond the immediate object: error can only arise when we regard the immediate object, i.e., the sense-datum, as the mark of some physical object." p. 110
Russell's view is that we are acquainted only with sense-data, of which material objects -- i.e., the object perceived, the physical senses and the human nervous system, are the cause. In other words, we have direct experience of sense-data, but only indirect experience of the objects the sense-data refer to. The object itself is not directly accessible, but is a 'thing-in-itself' which is known only inferentially via the physical senses.
"...we saw that...knowledge of physical objects, as opposed to sense-data, is only obtained by an inference, and that they are not things with which we are acquainted. Hence we can never know any proposition of the form 'this is a physical object', where 'this' is something immediately known. It follows that all our knowledge concerning physical objects is such that no actual instance is given. We can give instances of the associated sense-data, but we cannot give instances of the actual physical objects." p. 108
From the quotation above, it follows that relations among objects and events are also 'not things with which we are acquainted' and are therefore 'only attained by an inference'.
"Whatever we are acquainted with must be something; we may draw wrong inferences from our acquaintance, but the acquaintance itself cannot be deceptive. Thus there is no dualism as regards acquaintance. But as regards knowledge of truths, there is a dualism." p. 119
Russell on Immanuel Kant's 'thing-in-itself':
"Kant's 'thing-in-itself' is identical in definition with the physical object, namely, it is the cause of sensations. In the properties deduced from the definition it is not identical, since Kant held [the view]...that we can know that none of the categories are applicable to the 'thing in itself'." p. 86, footnote
Q: From where do the 'categories' arise and to what are they applicable?
A: They arise from the internal organ. The perceived object tells us something about both the external world and the internal organ (our biological faculties of experience). Even Russell's 'sense-data' is a function of the relationship between the internal organ and the external world. Of course, this is an inference, not a fact.
All perceived properties of an object, plus the way they are configured, involve the internal organ. The raw sense-data arise as a function of the interaction, via the senses, of the internal organ with the environment. The catagories are applicable to the sense-data and their configuration as objects and events. The catagories do not apply to things-in-themselves, but rather their manifestation in consciousness.
There is a witnessing consciousness to both empirical and a priori knowledge. Something known a priori (e.g., two plus two equals four) implies a knowledge which is accessible to the thinking apparatus (internal organ), irrespective of any contact of the senses with the outer world. However, without external stimulus it is probable that the thinking apparatus would lie dormant and never concieve of an a priori truth such as 2 + 2 = 4.
An object/event reveals something about the energetic relationship between the 'thing-in-itself' and the nervous system -- but how do we disentangle the two? The phenomenon perceived reveals something about both the 'thing-in-itself' and the internal organ.
Ramana Maharshi, who equates the witnessing consciousness or Self with 'being-consciousness' (Siva, or God), expresses the non-dualist view that the Self is both the source and the observer of all this. He comments: 'Siva (God) is the being assuming all forms and the consciousness seeing them. That is to say, Siva is the background underlying both the object and subject. Everything has its being in Siva and because of Siva.' Here Siva, consciousness and the Self are not in any sense separate from one another -- they are One; duality is an appearance only (as is time, as is causality).
Russell on facts and propositions:
"...facts and propositions...are...complexes with universals* and particulars as constituents. Facts constitute the way thing are; particulars having qualities and standing in various relations to one another. Propositions are the possibilities we grasp in thought; they represent particulars as having qualities and standing in relations. True propositions correspond to the facts." p. xii & xiii, introduction
* universals: the general (e.g. the colour red) as opposed to the particular (e.g. a specific red object).
For many millennia it was a fact that the sun literally 'rose' at sunrise. It was a fact that everyone agreed upon. The propositions of the early astronomer Ptolmey corresponded to this fact and were thus held to be true. In this case the fact was not 'the way things actually are', but rather 'the way things appear to be.' Ptolmey's proposition corresponded with the known facts for many centuries, but as anomalies began to show up as a result of further research (aided by the invention of the telescope) the facts changed and Ptolmey's proposition failed. Thus, while facts may be respected, they must always be held with a degree of tentativeness.
Fact: the sun rises every morning on one horizon and sets every evening on a different horizon. This is directly observable whenever there is no cloud-cover.
Proposition: the sun revolves around the earth. This proposition corresponds with the above fact. The proposition, 'I propose that the sun revolves around the earth' does not equate with 'I believe in the proposition that the sun revolves around the earth'. The former entertains some tentativeness, while the latter asserts certitude. Propositions can always turn out to be wrong or incomplete, no matter how overwhelming the immediate evidence.
A proposition is a possibility. The value of propositions is that they invite further investigation. Propositions are an important aspect of research, especially when research on a specific topic involves two or more people.
The way in which a group of sense-datum are configured -- i.e., related, is definitely mental. Consider the famous pencil sketch which can appear either as a woman's head and shoulders or as a human skull, but never both at the same time. In this instance we have two apparent 'facts' which seem to contradict one another. Any impression or interpretation is a 'fact of experience', but this does not guarantee that it is a fact of the external world, since it is subject to contradiction by further 'facts of experience'. The impression that the sun revolves around the earth was held to be a self-evident 'fact of experience' by humanity for a very long time, yet it ultimately proved to be wrong.
"For Russell, however, sense-data and some universals are beyond doubt, because we are acquainted with them (he is inclined to include the self too, but isn't quite sure). We know of other objects via these objects. The table is known by description*, as the 'cause' of the sense-data with which Russell is acquainted. That is, we take sense-data to be 'signs' of physical objects. And we take the features of our sense-data, to be signs of the features of the physical object." p. xxiv, introduction
* description: Since we can't know an object directly, but only indirectly through the specific sense-data associated with that object, all we can say is that the sense-data give us a 'description' of the object. It is the description that we know and not the object as it is in itself.
"The real table, if there is one, is not 'immediately' known to us at all, but must be an inference from what is immediately known." p. 11
"Here we have...one of the distinctions that cause the most trouble in philosophy -- the distinction between 'appearance' and 'reality'." p. 9
The appearance of a coiled snake at dusk may not be an accurate representation of reality. The apparent snake may in fact be something else (e.g., a coiled rope -- another appearance). This second possible appearance could also be inaccurate and could be a third thing, for example, a cow paddy. What is the true nature of the reality represented by these three different appearances? Can we ever be absolutely certain that we've got it right? If we are convinced, how can we prove that our certainty is incontestable? Russell would argue that through consistency and coherence we can infer the probable truth of something concerning the external world. But he would also insist that an inference is never a proof.
Russell on universals, particulars and knowledge by description:
"...it is necessary to guard against the supposition that whatever we can be acquainted with must be something particular and existent. Awareness of universals is called 'conceiving', and a universal of which we are aware is called a 'concept'." p. 52
The concept of 'red', for example, is a 'universal'. A specific patch of red associated with an object is a 'particular'.
"In logic...where we are concerned not merely with what does exist, but with whatever might or could exist, no reference to actual particulars is involved." p. 56
"...all knowledge of truths...demands acquaintance with things which are of a...different character from sense-data, the things which are sometimes called 'abstract ideas' but which we shall call 'universals'" p. 48
Universals are intellectual in nature. 'Sensible qualities' are similarities, not absolute equalities (e.g., patches of white which may vary slightly in colour tone). The abstraction of 'white' from 'patches of white' is intellectual, not sensorial.
"The chief importance of knowledge by description is that it enables us to pass beyond the limits of our private experience." p. 59
Knowledge by description is something human beings share with one another through language and other forms of communication. On the basis of this sharing we develop a common knowledge of the way things are. This common knowledge is 'public', as opposed to 'private'. Thus, groups of human beings have collective agreements about the nature of things. These agreements allow us to function together with relative social cohesion and harmony. The writing of laws and constitutions are examples of a group endeavor to come up with clear and unequivocal agreements concerning the management of the affairs of a society or nation. 'Public' agreements extend beyond governance and include science, art, environment, health, family, moral and ethical values, etc.
Russell on memory:
"...immediate knowledge by memory is the source of all our knowledge concerning the past..." p. 49
Russell on truth:
"...truth consists in some form of correspondence between belief and fact. It is, however, (difficult) to discover a form of correspondence to which there are no irrefutable objections." p. 121
"...coherence as the definition of truth fails because there is no proof that there can be only one coherent system." p. 122
"...the laws of logic supply the...framework within which the test of coherence applies, and they themselves cannot be established by this test." p. 123
"All arithmetic...can be deduced from the general principles of logic, yet the simple propositions of arithmetic, such as 'two and two are four', are just as self-evident as the principles of logic." p. 112
"...if there is any truth in our arithmetical beliefs, they must apply to things equally whether we think of them or not. Two physical objects and two other physical objects must make four physical objects, even if physical objects cannot be experienced." p. 87
"...whatever self-evident truths may be obtained from our senses must be different from the sense-data from which they are attained." p. 114
Is there any true 'discreteness' in the physical universe? Is the notion of discrete objects and events a function of the internal organ alone? For example, if we put ice-cubes in warm water, do we still have discrete, distinct, and clearly defined objects called 'ice-cubes'? Or, do we merely have a medium in which there is some 'lumpiness', but no discrete objects? If the latter is true, could this be extended to apply to the entire universe?
If there are discrete 'things-in-themselves', then the a priori truth that '2 + 2 = 4', would apply to them. If only mental phenomena have discreteness, and not the physical objects and events which make up the universe, then not only is '2 + 2 = 4' applicable only to those mental phenomena, but so is the idea of discreteness. Neither would apply in an external world where discrete objects and events do not really exist (which is probably the case).
Within any mass of sense-data, the intellect or discriminative faculty has the capacity to apprehend structure. Elementary structure always involves relatedness among the particulars of any group of sense-data, thus the perception of (perceived) discrete objects such as apples. This is a first level of abstraction. The intellect can further group these structures into categories based on features such colour, e.g., red apples, green apples and yellow apples. This is a second level of abstraction. A third level of abstraction would be to determine that the four red, three green and six yellow apples make a total of 13 apples. A further forth level of abstraction would be to drop all references to name (apple) and colour (red, green or yellow) and simply state the universal, '4 + 3 + 6 = 13'. All of this is a function of the power of the intellect to apprehend or abstract structure from the raw datum of experience. The forth level of abstraction has no direct relationship with sense-data, unlike levels one, two and three.
Now, the question is: Is the power of the intellect simply producing elegant 'truths' about fictitious things, or are these abstractions revealing something about the structure of a physical universe which exists independently of both the intellect and our immediate, private experience? Also, are there really any truly discrete events in the physical universe or, are events only 'apparently' discrete and, in fact, superimposed by the intellect on a universe in which discreteness does not exist? Is our world of separate objects and events merely a creation of our mental apparatus and not a true reflection of reality?
Russell argues that a theory of truth must be one which:
"1. allows truth to have an opposite, namely falsehood,
2. makes truth a property of beliefs, but
3. makes it a property wholly dependent upon the relation of
the belief to outside things." p. 123
Whatever I know (directly and without doubt) is private and experiential. That is to say, I know whatever is presented in experience and as experience to be self-evident. What I do not know with absolute certainty is whether what I know privately corresponds to something outside of my experience or whether, in fact, there is anything that exists outside of my experience.
I have direct, immediate acquaintance with the Self as it is presented in experience. I do not experience the Self as a 'thing-in-itself' -- i.e., revealing itself through sensation, but rather as a 'being-consciousness' which I am. In this direct Self-acquaintance, the body-mind and its aggregates either simply disappear or are perceived as adjuncts which adhere to, but are not, the Self.
Russell does not consider the hypothesis of an independent 'thing-in-itself', standing behind and separate from the appearance, to be either valid or provable.
Russell on matter and light:
"The collection of all physical objects is called 'matter'. Thus our two questions may be re-stated as follows: (1) Is there any such thing as matter? (2) If so, what is its nature?" p. 12
"...physical objects cannot be quite like our sense-data, but may be regarded as 'causing' our sensations"
p. 30
"...our sense-data are situated in our private spaces, either the space of sight or the sense of touch...etc" p. 30
"...we may assume that there is a physical space in which physical objects have spatial relations corresponding to those which the corresponding sense-data have in our private spaces. It is this physical space which is dealt with in geometry and assumed in physics and astronomy." p. 31
Yes, we may assume that there is a 'physical space', but an assumption is only an assumption. It's not a proof, but at best an inference.
"It is sometimes said that 'light is a form of wave-motion', but this is misleading, for the light which we immediately see, which we know directly by means of our senses, is 'not' a form of wave-motion, but something quite different -- which we all know if we are not blind, though we cannot describe it...to a man who is blind. A wave-motion...could...be described to a blind man, since he can acquire a knowledge of space by the sense of touch... But this...is not what we mean by 'light': we mean by 'light' just that which the blind man can never understand, and which we can never describe to him." p. 28
"When it is said that light 'is' waves, what is really meant is that waves are the physical cause of our sensations of light." p. 29
Science admits that the experience of light does not form any part of the world that we observe. Our brain, nervous system and senses do, however, form a part of the world. We can observe this and verify it accordingly. Experience, however, is much more illusive. Experience is totally private. You and I can both experience the same hockey game. But I cannot experience your experience of the hockey game, nor can you experience my experience of the hockey game. The most we can do is describe to one another our respective experience. Description, however, is entirely different from experience, similar to the difference between describing the taste of an apple and actually tasting an apple.
"...the space of science is neutral as between touch and sight: thus it cannot be either the space of touch or the space of sight." p. 29
"...real space is public... apparent space is private to the percipient." p. 29
Assuming that the objects we infer from sense-data really do exist, then there must be a 'real' (as opposed to apparent) space which contains them. It's still an inference -- however, it follows logically that if there are real entities (beyond mere appearance), then there must be a real space in which they exist.
'Apparent' is the key word in the above quote. Space as an appearance cannot be shared because it is an experience. To experience means to have something appear, e.g., a taste, a smell, an image, etc. But to appear presupposes consciousness. What, then, is consciousness? Can consciousness appear to itself? No, because that would make consciousness its own object, which is impossible. Consciousness is not a thing, but rather that which allows things to appear. Like light, we do not 'see' it, only the object's reflection in it. Without an object, light is invisible. By a limited analogy, consciousness is revealed through the objects and events reflected in it. Consciousness, like light is inferred from the appearance of things. Consciousness must be inferred, since it is never directly known...at least in the sense in which we know other things, such as colours, forms, sensations, etc.
Since consciousness is not an object, it cannot be known directly -- i.e., it does not appear as something to be conscious of. Therefore, it is inferred. Otherwise, how can 'appearance' and 'experience' be explained? Russell alludes to this when he writes:
"...light itself, the thing which seeing people experience and blind people do not, is not supposed by science to form any part of the world that is independent of us and our senses." p. 29
Russell distinguishes between light as wave-motion in physical space and the light which we see immediately by means of our senses. The light that we immediately see is subjective and private. If we do not infer consciousness, how do we explain experience? If the theory of light as wave-motion in physical space is correct, then it must exist independently of anyone's immediate experience of it. Its effect on our physical senses and nervous system explains specific sensations in terms of a theory of causality, but it does not explain knowledge of, experience of, awareness of... light itself. Inferring consciousness as something which exists independently of sensation and which is a necessary condition of sensation, is an assumption that is difficult to avoid making. If we refuse to admit consciousness as something independent of any specific sensation or group of sensations, then we are at a loss to explain how experience happens at all.
The physical reality of light is revealed as colours. In order to see colours there must be a second, non-physical (non-objective) light, which we shall call the light of consciousness. This light of consciousness is what is inferred from sensation (via the five senses) and internal states (thoughts, feelings, memories, etc) -- i.e., phenomenal consciousness. By 'phenomenal consciousness' I mean all possible experience in the form of 'consciousness of...'. From 'consciousness of...' a rock, a touch, an emotion, a thought, etc', I infer 'being-consciousness' which equates as the capacity to experience, to observe, to witness, to comprehend, to intuit, etc. This capacity underlies all experience, and its existence is not dependent upon any specific form of 'consciousness of...'. It underlies the three ordinary states of consciousness, as well as extraordinary states such as coma, drug-induced trance, hypnotic, paranormal, etc.
Russell on the philosopher George Berkeley's idealism:
"He proved first, by arguments which were largely valid, that our sense-data cannot be supposed to have an existence independent of us, but must be, in part at least, in the mind, in the sense that their existence would not continue if there were no seeing or hearing or touching or smelling or tasting." "...he went on to argue that sense-data were the only things of whose existence our perception could assure us, and that to be known is to be in a mind, and therefore to be mental." p. 38
The term 'mind' is difficult because it is vague. How do we define 'mind'? Everyone has their own idea of what it is. Yet, no one can can prove that 'mind' even exists. Why must sense-data be in a 'mind'? Why not simply say that sense-data are in awareness? The objects and events composed of sense-data would also, by extension, be in awareness, and this would include our bodies, sense organs and even intellectual processes. This would allow us to drop this nebulous invention called 'mind' and, with the elimination of 'mind', eliminate the age-old mind-body 'ghost-in-the-machine' problem.
Purely subjective events such as volition, desire, emotions, memories, etc, also 'appear' in awareness as related to the organism. All of these sense-data, objects, events and internal processes are directly known in awareness. There is no need to assume an elusive, intangible intermediary, called 'mind' which interposes itself. However, if we are going the keep the term 'mind', then we must be clear: either all experiences are in the mind or no experiences are in the mind, but never some experiences in the mind and other experiences not.
Mind is definitely not a 'thing', otherwise we would be able to objectify and observe it. No one, not even ourselves, ever sees our mind. What we call 'mind' is simply the total contents of consciousness at any given moment and, by extension, the transformation of those contents over time. This is Ramana Maharshi's definition of mind. Mind is whatever presents itself in the Now. However, just as an objective, independent 'knower' is inferred from experience, so is an invisible but apparently 'real', mind or subject inferred. We infer an invisible subject standing in some kind of time-space relationship with the object or event. In fact, however, a discrete 'mind', 'subject' or 'knower' is not known and nowhere to be found. Let's remember, inferences may be true until they are proven false. And any inference may at some point prove to be false. This this case, the inference is false.
Mind is the totality of what is being experienced in the present moment. But what is experience? Experience is a stream of 'knowingness' in which a subject knows its object(s). But knowingness also precedes the knower-known duality of ordinary waking and dreaming experience. This becomes evident during the brief interval between sleeping and waking, or during deep meditation, when there is simply conscious awareness by itself. In this state of pure knowingness, awareness can know itself, but without the habitual subject-object duality. It knows itself by being itself, it is self-awareness without an object.
The recognition that all of our subjective feelings and thoughts, as well as all the objective things and events of our experience, exist in awareness does not preclude the possibility of an independent, external world, anymore than it precludes the possibility that there is no external world. Does matter really exist? Physics still has not located a final, finest partical of hard matter at the core of the universe, and it seems unlikely that such an object will be discovered. Much more likely is that all matter is ultimately reducible to energy.
"We think of an idea as essentially something in somebody's mind, and thus when we are told that a tree consists entirely of ideas, it is natural to suppose that, if so, the tree must be entirely in minds. But the notion of being in the mind is ambiguous." p. 40
The notion, 'A tree consists entirely of ideas...' has two aspects. One is the sense-data which make up the appearance of a 'tree'. The other is our conceptual knowledge of trees -- i.e., the meaning we give them, our knowledge of how they function, their usefulness to humans, etc. All of this is mental and does not refer directly to the tree as it is 'in-itself'. In this sense, a tree is entirely in the mind.
"...when Berkeley says that the tree must be in our minds if we can know it, all that he really has a right to say is that a thought of the tree must be in our minds. To argue that the tree itself must be in our minds is like arguing that a person who we bear in mind is himself in our minds." p. 40
All experience is, in itself real, while what it refers to may be unreal. For example, the experience of seeing blue water in a desert is real even though, with reference to an external world, it is a mirage and therefore unreal. If I 'bear you in mind', I am bearing in mind my impression or memory of you. You may be climbing a Himalayan mountain while I think of you, imagining you sitting on a beach. If there really is an external world then you are definitely not in my mind.
"...Berkeley was right in treating the sense-data which constitute our perception of the tree as more or less subjective, in the sense that they depend upon us as much as upon the tree, and would not exist if the tree was not being perceived."
p. 41
Berkeley was an extreme idealist and has been accused of solipsism -- the idea that the self is all that exists, that nothing exists independently of the mind. Realist philosophy rejects this. From a realist viewpoint, any act of apprehension is caused ultimately by the interaction of mind and the external world. The recognition of any object or event is an act of apprehension. Meaning arises as a function of the relations among objects and events. Grasping relations is what gives meaning. The capacity to apprehend is a power of the intellect. Mind apprehends objects and events from the mass of sense-data which it passively receives through the instrumentality of the senses. Intellect configures the received sense-data into specific forms as objects and events, and then apprehends relatedness among and between them. The word 'meaning' indicates an apprehension of relatedness. To give or recognize relatedness among sense-data, or among objects and events, is to give meaning or sense to what is received (i.e., sense-data) or apprehended (i.e., objects, events). Intellect also apprehends the body with which it identifies itself, as well as the body's other instruments: the senses, the nervous system, the brain, etc. The realist assumes that there is an actual 'thing-in-itself' termed 'tree' or 'my body' which is being represented by the sense-data which comprise the appearance of a tree or my body. A more primitive form of realism dispenses with the duality of sense-data and the 'thing-in-itself', and assumes no distinction whatsoever between the appearance and the thing which is appearing. It believes that the tree it is seeing is exactly what the tree is.
To the realist every object, event or sense-datum appearing in consciousness must have a physiological correlate. This is the biological explanation for of the phenomenon of 'consciousness of... (fill in the blank)'. That of which we are conscious is in a certain sense 'living' in the organism, whether that item is something external and perceived by the senses, or something internal (such as memory, fantasy, emotion, etc) which does not immediately involve the senses. When all appearances disappear and, by extension, all supposed causal biological activities cease, then there is nothing (no-thing). This 'nothingness' could be the insentience of deep sleep. It also could be the unqualified wakefulness of pure consciousness (the nirvikalpa samadhi state of deep meditation), in which case, the complete absence of all distinctions would be simply the un-manifest consciousness -- pure consciousness -- which remains when the 'of' of 'consciousness of...' drops away. From the realist viewpoint -- which is the opposite of Berkley's idealism -- the material external world will still be there whether anyone is conscious of it or not.
"...Berkeley seeks to prove that whatever can be immediately known must be in a mind." p. 41
To be 'immediately known' is to appear in consciousness. Whatever appears in consciousness is what is immediately known. The term, 'thing-in-itself' refers, for example, to a specific tree assumed to exist in an external world. As a thing-in-itself, it is independent of our perception of it. Such a tree may exist, but this does not mean that the tree is 'known' to exist. Existence does not require being known. Berkeley does not accept this. As a pure idealist, the reality called 'a tree' must exist in someone's mind -- even if that someone has to be God Himself. If it does not exist in some mind, then it does not exist at all.
"...the sense-data which make up the appearance of my table are things with which I have acquaintance, things immediately known to me just as they are." "My knowledge of the table as a physical object, on the contrary, is not direct knowledge. Such as it is, it is obtained through acquaintance with the sense-data that make up the appearance of the table. We have seen that it is possible...to doubt whether there is a table at all, whereas it is not possible to doubt the sense-data." "The table is the physical object which causes such-and-such sense-data." p. 47
That the table is an independent physical object which causes sense-data to appear is an inference. In actuality, the table is an appearance that has been constructed, by the intellect and memory, from the unrelated sense-data of immediate acquaintance. The individual sense-datum may appear to be simultaneous and in close proximity with one another, but it is the intellect that creates relatedness among the sense-data and gives the resulting object meaning (such as, 'a surface upon which objects can be placed', 'food eaten', 'writing done', etc). A table is a table, not only because it has a certain size and shape, but more importantly because it serves certain purposes which the intellect assigns to it. A fly may have a totally different visual/tactile impression of a table and absolutely no similar association of meaning. A fly would not associate a table with writing or place settings. So then, what is the 'physical object' -- the 'thing-in-itself' -- which I learn about through the sense-data with which I am immediately acquainted?
The physical universe, including our own bodies, senses, etc, is a construction created from the plethora of sense-data with which we are acquainted. Of course, we infer that the intellect and memory (which are not themselves sense-data but which are, nevertheless, revealed through them) are the instruments of this construction. An inference itself is not sense-data, it is an ideation. An ideation is itself an appearance, only it is not directly associated with sense-data. It is actually thought (or memory) applied to the sense-data. It is the principle or idea around which the sense-data are assembled. And, ideation reveals itself through the object or event which it has constructed. It is difficult to imagine ideation functioning in the absence of sense-data, although this is what happens during the dream state. If a man were blind, deaf, unable to feel, taste or smell, he could still engage in ideation but only on the basis of previous sensory experience stored in his memory as food for further thought.
Russell on introspection and acquaintance with the self:
"We are not only aware of things, but we are often aware of being aware of them. When I see the sun, I am often aware of my seeing the sun; thus 'my seeing the sun' is an object with which I am acquainted." "This kind of acquaintance...called self-consciousness, is the source of all our knowledge of mental things." p. 49
In order to be aware of being aware of something -- i.e., to objectify that of which there is awareness, we must posit an empirical subject or ego who stands in some form of time-space relationship with the object or event. This must be true of physical things.
What about mental things, such as 'abstract ideas'? Yes, I can be aware that I am thinking about an abstraction such as the second law of thermodynamics or the general concept of 'red'. However, my relationship with this abstraction is neither temporal nor spatial. Nevertheless, I have a relationship with this thought: I have objectified it as something other than myself. I have a belief or an idea -- things which I cannot see or touch -- yet they belong to me. So, what exactly is this empirical ego, me?
Awareness of non-physical things, such as memories or ideas, are not the same as sense-data, since the senses are not directly involved. However, we can see the colour 'blue' with our eyes closed or hear music with our ears plugged. So, we must make a distinction between gross sense-data (external, via the senses) and subtle ideas and sense objects (internal, no sense contact). Both forms of experience are immediate, direct and there can be no doubting their existence. In either case,'I' am experiencing them. They exist immediately in my awareness and as such are undeniable. This experiencing 'I' is the empirical ego.
"...self-consciousness is one of the things that separates men from animals: animals, we may suppose, though they have acquaintance with sense-data, never become aware of this acquaintance. I do not mean that they doubt whether they exist, but that they have never become conscious of the fact that they have sensations and feelings, nor therefore of the fact that they, the subject of their sensations and feelings, exist." p. 49 & 50
Animals may not conceptualize, however, they have a sense of 'my-ness' and possession. They also have feelings, and so we can assume that they are aware of these feelings. A mother cat or dog with a litter of three definitely knows that if only two are present, then one is missing. She may not count 'one...two...three', but she knows the difference between two and three, and will search everywhere for her missing baby. She will also put her life at risk to protect her offspring. She has a strong sense of 'I'-ness, or relationship and powerful feelings that will motivate her to fight to the death to protect her young. She may not conceptualize the subject-object relationship, but she certainly knows that she is different from her child and has a unique relationship with it. Her knowing is immediate and intuitive, rather than conceptual. How can we conclude from this that she is not self-conscious, unless by self-conscious we mean that she is 'thinking' about herself?
"We have spoken of acquaintance with the contents of our minds as 'self'-consciousness, but it is not, of course, consciousness of our 'self': it is consciousness of particular thoughts and feelings. The question whether we are also acquainted with our bare selves as opposed to particular thoughts and feelings, is a very difficult one, upon which it would be rash to speak positively. When we try to look into ourselves we always seem to come upon some particular thought or feeling, and not upon the 'I' which has the thought or feeling. Nevertheless there are some reasons for thinking that we are acquainted with the 'I', though the acquaintance is hard to disentangle from other things." p. 50
Russell is a highly perceptive and subtle thinker, to which the above quotation testifies. He is also a very careful thinker, acknowledging the limits of thought when it comes to speaking of the self. He recognizes the difficulty of self as subject inquiring into it's own nature. The yoga method of self-enquiry also recognizes that the self cannot analyse itself, since it is a subject and not a thing. Thus there can be no subjective 'I'-entity which has any particular thought, but only an 'I'- thought of which the self as subject is conscious. Furthermore, when we turn our attention inward and look for this 'I'-thought we find that it disappears, like a shadow before a lamp. What remains is the self as a subject without an object. In yoga practice, this is known as 'self-enquiry' (atma vichara): looking for the 'I' who has the thought of 'I' (or of any other object). Whenever we look for the experiencing 'I' by putting our attention on it, it disappears. Why? Because the 'I' can never be an object and therefore can never be observed directly. Paradoxically, when we stop looking for it, it reappears. So what is this 'I' that disappears when we look for it and appears when we leave it alone? It is a thought, neither more nor less. As such, it has no substance and cannot be found by looking or searching for it with the intellect. This seems to be what Russell is intuiting.
"All acquaintance...seems obviously a relation between the person acquainted and the object with which the person is acquainted." p. 50
"When a case of acquaintance is one with which I can be acquainted (as I am acquainted with my acquaintance with the sense-datum representing the sun), it is plain that the person acquainted is myself. Thus, when I am acquainted with my seeing sun, the whole fact with which I am acquainted is 'Self-acquainted-with-sense-datum." p. 50
"It does not seem necessary to suppose that we are acquainted with a more or less permanent person...but it does seem as though we must be acquainted with that thing, whatever its nature, which sees the sun and has acquaintance with sense-data." p. 50 & 51
"...in some sense it would seem we must be acquainted with our Selves as opposed to our particular experiences" p. 51
"...although acquaintance with ourselves seems probably to occur, it is not wise to assert that it undoubtedly does occur."
p. 51
We can never have acquaintance with the self in the sense of knowing it objectively -- since the self is a subject and never an object. We can, however, intuit it directly by removing all objective experience while in a fully awakened state, i.e.-- transcendent consciousness or nirvikalpa samadhi. The silence of nirvikalpa samadhi is very different from the silence of deep sleep. We cannot point at these two states and say, 'See the difference!'. We would need our own direct experience of each in order to really grasp the difference. However, even without direct experience, a profound difference between nirvikalpa samadhi and deep sleep can be inferred from the study of subjects' brain wave patterns during those two states
Q: Is the 'external' world really external? It must be true that if we have a physical body and senses, then there is a physical world external to our body and senses. It is also true that our physical body belongs to the external world. This is unequivocal, for if I am looking at my left and right hands, I can't say that the right one exists and the left one doesn't. Either they both exist or they both don't. If my body and senses -- which are recognized as belonging to the physical universe -- exist, then the universe must exist. If the universe is unreal, then so are my body and senses equally unreal. There is certainly a world external to our physical body, since our body is a 'thing' in the midst of an innumerable number of other 'things'. We must not forget, however, that to us as observers, knowers and experiencers, both the body and the world are not more than appearances. We never directly experience the 'thing-in-itself' of which the appearance, supposedly, is a reflection.
Consciousness, however, unlike the world and our body is not a 'thing' and therefore can be neither external or internal to either of them. If we are the Self ('being-consciousness) then there can be no 'external' world with which we have a physical relationship. For us, the exact relationship between the physical universe and the Self remains a mystery. For the rishis (seers) of ancient India, however, there was no relationship at all between the universe and the Self, since they were not separate. These poet-seers of the Upanishads* saw no duality, only unity. For them all conceived dualities, such as non-physical/physical, subject-object and I-other, were unreal.
S. Dasgupta, in his seminal, 'A History of Indian Philosophy', writes: 'If we overlook the different shades in the development of the conception of Brahman ('being-consciousness') in the Upanishads and look to the main currents, we find that the strongest current of thought which has found expression in the majority of the texts is this, that the atman (Self) or Brahman is the only reality and that besides this everything else is unreal.' Vol. 1, pg 30
* Historic texts which comprise the monistic philosophy of Vedanta
"...our sense-data are situated in our private spaces, either the space of sight or the sense of touch...etc" p. 30
"...we may assume that there is a physical space in which physical objects have spatial relations corresponding to those which the corresponding sense-data have in our private spaces. It is this physical space which is dealt with in geometry and assumed in physics and astronomy." p. 31
Yes, we may assume that there is a 'physical space', but an assumption is only an assumption. It's not a proof, but at best an inference.
"It is sometimes said that 'light is a form of wave-motion', but this is misleading, for the light which we immediately see, which we know directly by means of our senses, is 'not' a form of wave-motion, but something quite different -- which we all know if we are not blind, though we cannot describe it...to a man who is blind. A wave-motion...could...be described to a blind man, since he can acquire a knowledge of space by the sense of touch... But this...is not what we mean by 'light': we mean by 'light' just that which the blind man can never understand, and which we can never describe to him." p. 28
"When it is said that light 'is' waves, what is really meant is that waves are the physical cause of our sensations of light." p. 29
Science admits that the experience of light does not form any part of the world that we observe. Our brain, nervous system and senses do, however, form a part of the world. We can observe this and verify it accordingly. Experience, however, is much more illusive. Experience is totally private. You and I can both experience the same hockey game. But I cannot experience your experience of the hockey game, nor can you experience my experience of the hockey game. The most we can do is describe to one another our respective experience. Description, however, is entirely different from experience, similar to the difference between describing the taste of an apple and actually tasting an apple.
"...the space of science is neutral as between touch and sight: thus it cannot be either the space of touch or the space of sight." p. 29
"...real space is public... apparent space is private to the percipient." p. 29
Assuming that the objects we infer from sense-data really do exist, then there must be a 'real' (as opposed to apparent) space which contains them. It's still an inference -- however, it follows logically that if there are real entities (beyond mere appearance), then there must be a real space in which they exist.
'Apparent' is the key word in the above quote. Space as an appearance cannot be shared because it is an experience. To experience means to have something appear, e.g., a taste, a smell, an image, etc. But to appear presupposes consciousness. What, then, is consciousness? Can consciousness appear to itself? No, because that would make consciousness its own object, which is impossible. Consciousness is not a thing, but rather that which allows things to appear. Like light, we do not 'see' it, only the object's reflection in it. Without an object, light is invisible. By a limited analogy, consciousness is revealed through the objects and events reflected in it. Consciousness, like light is inferred from the appearance of things. Consciousness must be inferred, since it is never directly known...at least in the sense in which we know other things, such as colours, forms, sensations, etc.
Since consciousness is not an object, it cannot be known directly -- i.e., it does not appear as something to be conscious of. Therefore, it is inferred. Otherwise, how can 'appearance' and 'experience' be explained? Russell alludes to this when he writes:
"...light itself, the thing which seeing people experience and blind people do not, is not supposed by science to form any part of the world that is independent of us and our senses." p. 29
Russell distinguishes between light as wave-motion in physical space and the light which we see immediately by means of our senses. The light that we immediately see is subjective and private. If we do not infer consciousness, how do we explain experience? If the theory of light as wave-motion in physical space is correct, then it must exist independently of anyone's immediate experience of it. Its effect on our physical senses and nervous system explains specific sensations in terms of a theory of causality, but it does not explain knowledge of, experience of, awareness of... light itself. Inferring consciousness as something which exists independently of sensation and which is a necessary condition of sensation, is an assumption that is difficult to avoid making. If we refuse to admit consciousness as something independent of any specific sensation or group of sensations, then we are at a loss to explain how experience happens at all.
The physical reality of light is revealed as colours. In order to see colours there must be a second, non-physical (non-objective) light, which we shall call the light of consciousness. This light of consciousness is what is inferred from sensation (via the five senses) and internal states (thoughts, feelings, memories, etc) -- i.e., phenomenal consciousness. By 'phenomenal consciousness' I mean all possible experience in the form of 'consciousness of...'. From 'consciousness of...' a rock, a touch, an emotion, a thought, etc', I infer 'being-consciousness' which equates as the capacity to experience, to observe, to witness, to comprehend, to intuit, etc. This capacity underlies all experience, and its existence is not dependent upon any specific form of 'consciousness of...'. It underlies the three ordinary states of consciousness, as well as extraordinary states such as coma, drug-induced trance, hypnotic, paranormal, etc.
Russell on the philosopher George Berkeley's idealism:
"He proved first, by arguments which were largely valid, that our sense-data cannot be supposed to have an existence independent of us, but must be, in part at least, in the mind, in the sense that their existence would not continue if there were no seeing or hearing or touching or smelling or tasting." "...he went on to argue that sense-data were the only things of whose existence our perception could assure us, and that to be known is to be in a mind, and therefore to be mental." p. 38
The term 'mind' is difficult because it is vague. How do we define 'mind'? Everyone has their own idea of what it is. Yet, no one can can prove that 'mind' even exists. Why must sense-data be in a 'mind'? Why not simply say that sense-data are in awareness? The objects and events composed of sense-data would also, by extension, be in awareness, and this would include our bodies, sense organs and even intellectual processes. This would allow us to drop this nebulous invention called 'mind' and, with the elimination of 'mind', eliminate the age-old mind-body 'ghost-in-the-machine' problem.
Purely subjective events such as volition, desire, emotions, memories, etc, also 'appear' in awareness as related to the organism. All of these sense-data, objects, events and internal processes are directly known in awareness. There is no need to assume an elusive, intangible intermediary, called 'mind' which interposes itself. However, if we are going the keep the term 'mind', then we must be clear: either all experiences are in the mind or no experiences are in the mind, but never some experiences in the mind and other experiences not.
Mind is definitely not a 'thing', otherwise we would be able to objectify and observe it. No one, not even ourselves, ever sees our mind. What we call 'mind' is simply the total contents of consciousness at any given moment and, by extension, the transformation of those contents over time. This is Ramana Maharshi's definition of mind. Mind is whatever presents itself in the Now. However, just as an objective, independent 'knower' is inferred from experience, so is an invisible but apparently 'real', mind or subject inferred. We infer an invisible subject standing in some kind of time-space relationship with the object or event. In fact, however, a discrete 'mind', 'subject' or 'knower' is not known and nowhere to be found. Let's remember, inferences may be true until they are proven false. And any inference may at some point prove to be false. This this case, the inference is false.
Mind is the totality of what is being experienced in the present moment. But what is experience? Experience is a stream of 'knowingness' in which a subject knows its object(s). But knowingness also precedes the knower-known duality of ordinary waking and dreaming experience. This becomes evident during the brief interval between sleeping and waking, or during deep meditation, when there is simply conscious awareness by itself. In this state of pure knowingness, awareness can know itself, but without the habitual subject-object duality. It knows itself by being itself, it is self-awareness without an object.
The recognition that all of our subjective feelings and thoughts, as well as all the objective things and events of our experience, exist in awareness does not preclude the possibility of an independent, external world, anymore than it precludes the possibility that there is no external world. Does matter really exist? Physics still has not located a final, finest partical of hard matter at the core of the universe, and it seems unlikely that such an object will be discovered. Much more likely is that all matter is ultimately reducible to energy.
"We think of an idea as essentially something in somebody's mind, and thus when we are told that a tree consists entirely of ideas, it is natural to suppose that, if so, the tree must be entirely in minds. But the notion of being in the mind is ambiguous." p. 40
The notion, 'A tree consists entirely of ideas...' has two aspects. One is the sense-data which make up the appearance of a 'tree'. The other is our conceptual knowledge of trees -- i.e., the meaning we give them, our knowledge of how they function, their usefulness to humans, etc. All of this is mental and does not refer directly to the tree as it is 'in-itself'. In this sense, a tree is entirely in the mind.
"...when Berkeley says that the tree must be in our minds if we can know it, all that he really has a right to say is that a thought of the tree must be in our minds. To argue that the tree itself must be in our minds is like arguing that a person who we bear in mind is himself in our minds." p. 40
All experience is, in itself real, while what it refers to may be unreal. For example, the experience of seeing blue water in a desert is real even though, with reference to an external world, it is a mirage and therefore unreal. If I 'bear you in mind', I am bearing in mind my impression or memory of you. You may be climbing a Himalayan mountain while I think of you, imagining you sitting on a beach. If there really is an external world then you are definitely not in my mind.
"...Berkeley was right in treating the sense-data which constitute our perception of the tree as more or less subjective, in the sense that they depend upon us as much as upon the tree, and would not exist if the tree was not being perceived."
p. 41
Berkeley was an extreme idealist and has been accused of solipsism -- the idea that the self is all that exists, that nothing exists independently of the mind. Realist philosophy rejects this. From a realist viewpoint, any act of apprehension is caused ultimately by the interaction of mind and the external world. The recognition of any object or event is an act of apprehension. Meaning arises as a function of the relations among objects and events. Grasping relations is what gives meaning. The capacity to apprehend is a power of the intellect. Mind apprehends objects and events from the mass of sense-data which it passively receives through the instrumentality of the senses. Intellect configures the received sense-data into specific forms as objects and events, and then apprehends relatedness among and between them. The word 'meaning' indicates an apprehension of relatedness. To give or recognize relatedness among sense-data, or among objects and events, is to give meaning or sense to what is received (i.e., sense-data) or apprehended (i.e., objects, events). Intellect also apprehends the body with which it identifies itself, as well as the body's other instruments: the senses, the nervous system, the brain, etc. The realist assumes that there is an actual 'thing-in-itself' termed 'tree' or 'my body' which is being represented by the sense-data which comprise the appearance of a tree or my body. A more primitive form of realism dispenses with the duality of sense-data and the 'thing-in-itself', and assumes no distinction whatsoever between the appearance and the thing which is appearing. It believes that the tree it is seeing is exactly what the tree is.
To the realist every object, event or sense-datum appearing in consciousness must have a physiological correlate. This is the biological explanation for of the phenomenon of 'consciousness of... (fill in the blank)'. That of which we are conscious is in a certain sense 'living' in the organism, whether that item is something external and perceived by the senses, or something internal (such as memory, fantasy, emotion, etc) which does not immediately involve the senses. When all appearances disappear and, by extension, all supposed causal biological activities cease, then there is nothing (no-thing). This 'nothingness' could be the insentience of deep sleep. It also could be the unqualified wakefulness of pure consciousness (the nirvikalpa samadhi state of deep meditation), in which case, the complete absence of all distinctions would be simply the un-manifest consciousness -- pure consciousness -- which remains when the 'of' of 'consciousness of...' drops away. From the realist viewpoint -- which is the opposite of Berkley's idealism -- the material external world will still be there whether anyone is conscious of it or not.
"...Berkeley seeks to prove that whatever can be immediately known must be in a mind." p. 41
To be 'immediately known' is to appear in consciousness. Whatever appears in consciousness is what is immediately known. The term, 'thing-in-itself' refers, for example, to a specific tree assumed to exist in an external world. As a thing-in-itself, it is independent of our perception of it. Such a tree may exist, but this does not mean that the tree is 'known' to exist. Existence does not require being known. Berkeley does not accept this. As a pure idealist, the reality called 'a tree' must exist in someone's mind -- even if that someone has to be God Himself. If it does not exist in some mind, then it does not exist at all.
"...the sense-data which make up the appearance of my table are things with which I have acquaintance, things immediately known to me just as they are." "My knowledge of the table as a physical object, on the contrary, is not direct knowledge. Such as it is, it is obtained through acquaintance with the sense-data that make up the appearance of the table. We have seen that it is possible...to doubt whether there is a table at all, whereas it is not possible to doubt the sense-data." "The table is the physical object which causes such-and-such sense-data." p. 47
That the table is an independent physical object which causes sense-data to appear is an inference. In actuality, the table is an appearance that has been constructed, by the intellect and memory, from the unrelated sense-data of immediate acquaintance. The individual sense-datum may appear to be simultaneous and in close proximity with one another, but it is the intellect that creates relatedness among the sense-data and gives the resulting object meaning (such as, 'a surface upon which objects can be placed', 'food eaten', 'writing done', etc). A table is a table, not only because it has a certain size and shape, but more importantly because it serves certain purposes which the intellect assigns to it. A fly may have a totally different visual/tactile impression of a table and absolutely no similar association of meaning. A fly would not associate a table with writing or place settings. So then, what is the 'physical object' -- the 'thing-in-itself' -- which I learn about through the sense-data with which I am immediately acquainted?
The physical universe, including our own bodies, senses, etc, is a construction created from the plethora of sense-data with which we are acquainted. Of course, we infer that the intellect and memory (which are not themselves sense-data but which are, nevertheless, revealed through them) are the instruments of this construction. An inference itself is not sense-data, it is an ideation. An ideation is itself an appearance, only it is not directly associated with sense-data. It is actually thought (or memory) applied to the sense-data. It is the principle or idea around which the sense-data are assembled. And, ideation reveals itself through the object or event which it has constructed. It is difficult to imagine ideation functioning in the absence of sense-data, although this is what happens during the dream state. If a man were blind, deaf, unable to feel, taste or smell, he could still engage in ideation but only on the basis of previous sensory experience stored in his memory as food for further thought.
Russell on introspection and acquaintance with the self:
"We are not only aware of things, but we are often aware of being aware of them. When I see the sun, I am often aware of my seeing the sun; thus 'my seeing the sun' is an object with which I am acquainted." "This kind of acquaintance...called self-consciousness, is the source of all our knowledge of mental things." p. 49
In order to be aware of being aware of something -- i.e., to objectify that of which there is awareness, we must posit an empirical subject or ego who stands in some form of time-space relationship with the object or event. This must be true of physical things.
What about mental things, such as 'abstract ideas'? Yes, I can be aware that I am thinking about an abstraction such as the second law of thermodynamics or the general concept of 'red'. However, my relationship with this abstraction is neither temporal nor spatial. Nevertheless, I have a relationship with this thought: I have objectified it as something other than myself. I have a belief or an idea -- things which I cannot see or touch -- yet they belong to me. So, what exactly is this empirical ego, me?
Awareness of non-physical things, such as memories or ideas, are not the same as sense-data, since the senses are not directly involved. However, we can see the colour 'blue' with our eyes closed or hear music with our ears plugged. So, we must make a distinction between gross sense-data (external, via the senses) and subtle ideas and sense objects (internal, no sense contact). Both forms of experience are immediate, direct and there can be no doubting their existence. In either case,'I' am experiencing them. They exist immediately in my awareness and as such are undeniable. This experiencing 'I' is the empirical ego.
"...self-consciousness is one of the things that separates men from animals: animals, we may suppose, though they have acquaintance with sense-data, never become aware of this acquaintance. I do not mean that they doubt whether they exist, but that they have never become conscious of the fact that they have sensations and feelings, nor therefore of the fact that they, the subject of their sensations and feelings, exist." p. 49 & 50
Animals may not conceptualize, however, they have a sense of 'my-ness' and possession. They also have feelings, and so we can assume that they are aware of these feelings. A mother cat or dog with a litter of three definitely knows that if only two are present, then one is missing. She may not count 'one...two...three', but she knows the difference between two and three, and will search everywhere for her missing baby. She will also put her life at risk to protect her offspring. She has a strong sense of 'I'-ness, or relationship and powerful feelings that will motivate her to fight to the death to protect her young. She may not conceptualize the subject-object relationship, but she certainly knows that she is different from her child and has a unique relationship with it. Her knowing is immediate and intuitive, rather than conceptual. How can we conclude from this that she is not self-conscious, unless by self-conscious we mean that she is 'thinking' about herself?
"We have spoken of acquaintance with the contents of our minds as 'self'-consciousness, but it is not, of course, consciousness of our 'self': it is consciousness of particular thoughts and feelings. The question whether we are also acquainted with our bare selves as opposed to particular thoughts and feelings, is a very difficult one, upon which it would be rash to speak positively. When we try to look into ourselves we always seem to come upon some particular thought or feeling, and not upon the 'I' which has the thought or feeling. Nevertheless there are some reasons for thinking that we are acquainted with the 'I', though the acquaintance is hard to disentangle from other things." p. 50
Russell is a highly perceptive and subtle thinker, to which the above quotation testifies. He is also a very careful thinker, acknowledging the limits of thought when it comes to speaking of the self. He recognizes the difficulty of self as subject inquiring into it's own nature. The yoga method of self-enquiry also recognizes that the self cannot analyse itself, since it is a subject and not a thing. Thus there can be no subjective 'I'-entity which has any particular thought, but only an 'I'- thought of which the self as subject is conscious. Furthermore, when we turn our attention inward and look for this 'I'-thought we find that it disappears, like a shadow before a lamp. What remains is the self as a subject without an object. In yoga practice, this is known as 'self-enquiry' (atma vichara): looking for the 'I' who has the thought of 'I' (or of any other object). Whenever we look for the experiencing 'I' by putting our attention on it, it disappears. Why? Because the 'I' can never be an object and therefore can never be observed directly. Paradoxically, when we stop looking for it, it reappears. So what is this 'I' that disappears when we look for it and appears when we leave it alone? It is a thought, neither more nor less. As such, it has no substance and cannot be found by looking or searching for it with the intellect. This seems to be what Russell is intuiting.
"All acquaintance...seems obviously a relation between the person acquainted and the object with which the person is acquainted." p. 50
"When a case of acquaintance is one with which I can be acquainted (as I am acquainted with my acquaintance with the sense-datum representing the sun), it is plain that the person acquainted is myself. Thus, when I am acquainted with my seeing sun, the whole fact with which I am acquainted is 'Self-acquainted-with-sense-datum." p. 50
"It does not seem necessary to suppose that we are acquainted with a more or less permanent person...but it does seem as though we must be acquainted with that thing, whatever its nature, which sees the sun and has acquaintance with sense-data." p. 50 & 51
"...in some sense it would seem we must be acquainted with our Selves as opposed to our particular experiences" p. 51
"...although acquaintance with ourselves seems probably to occur, it is not wise to assert that it undoubtedly does occur."
p. 51
We can never have acquaintance with the self in the sense of knowing it objectively -- since the self is a subject and never an object. We can, however, intuit it directly by removing all objective experience while in a fully awakened state, i.e.-- transcendent consciousness or nirvikalpa samadhi. The silence of nirvikalpa samadhi is very different from the silence of deep sleep. We cannot point at these two states and say, 'See the difference!'. We would need our own direct experience of each in order to really grasp the difference. However, even without direct experience, a profound difference between nirvikalpa samadhi and deep sleep can be inferred from the study of subjects' brain wave patterns during those two states
Q: Is the 'external' world really external? It must be true that if we have a physical body and senses, then there is a physical world external to our body and senses. It is also true that our physical body belongs to the external world. This is unequivocal, for if I am looking at my left and right hands, I can't say that the right one exists and the left one doesn't. Either they both exist or they both don't. If my body and senses -- which are recognized as belonging to the physical universe -- exist, then the universe must exist. If the universe is unreal, then so are my body and senses equally unreal. There is certainly a world external to our physical body, since our body is a 'thing' in the midst of an innumerable number of other 'things'. We must not forget, however, that to us as observers, knowers and experiencers, both the body and the world are not more than appearances. We never directly experience the 'thing-in-itself' of which the appearance, supposedly, is a reflection.
Consciousness, however, unlike the world and our body is not a 'thing' and therefore can be neither external or internal to either of them. If we are the Self ('being-consciousness) then there can be no 'external' world with which we have a physical relationship. For us, the exact relationship between the physical universe and the Self remains a mystery. For the rishis (seers) of ancient India, however, there was no relationship at all between the universe and the Self, since they were not separate. These poet-seers of the Upanishads* saw no duality, only unity. For them all conceived dualities, such as non-physical/physical, subject-object and I-other, were unreal.
S. Dasgupta, in his seminal, 'A History of Indian Philosophy', writes: 'If we overlook the different shades in the development of the conception of Brahman ('being-consciousness') in the Upanishads and look to the main currents, we find that the strongest current of thought which has found expression in the majority of the texts is this, that the atman (Self) or Brahman is the only reality and that besides this everything else is unreal.' Vol. 1, pg 30
* Historic texts which comprise the monistic philosophy of Vedanta
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