Adi Shankara and Superimposition

An Indian sage once wrote: '...it is wrong to superimpose upon the subject...the attributes of the object and, conversely, to superimpose...[upon the object] the attributes of the subject.' With these words, Adi Shankara (India, eighth century) pierced the gordian knot of human misery. The primal cause of human suffering is a false superimposition in the mind of an object on the subject. It is this fundamental confusing of the respective natures of subject and object which produces our personal anguish and anxiety and, by extension our social tensions and conflicts.

Our knowledge of things is ultimately rooted in experience, and ordinary experience always involves an object or event as well as a subject. In order to more easily grasp the notion of superimposition, Shankara gives an illustration using two objects, rather than the more difficult relation of subject and object. Shankara defines superimposition as, 'the apparent presentation to consciousness, in the form of remembrance, of something previously observed in some other thing existing now.' He demonstrates this false superimposition with the example of a snake and a rope. A man on a road sees a snake coiled up and ready to strike. He jumps back in fear. He peers through the evening gloom at object of his fear and gives a sigh of relief when he realizes his mistake: the snake is merely a piece a rope. He walks on.

The man had unconsciously superimposed on the rope his memory of a snake. All of this happened within his own consciousness although he was convinced the snake was real and external to himself. The phenomenon of superimposition creates illusions which can trigger a whole chain of events. In our example, the man's misperception triggered the emotion of fear and stopped him in his tracks. Other forms of superimposition can be more catastrophic, as when a vengeful man murders an innocent person. In fact, a good case can be made that most human conflict, including war and genocide, is rooted in misperceptions arising from superimposition.

Regarding the more difficult matter of superimposition occurring between subject and object, Shankara affirms that it is natural for human beings to superimpose the qualities of the object on the subject. However, he also holds that this tendency is deeply flawed. The essence of his argument is that the subject can never become its own object and therefore can never have observable qualities. For example, the self as subject cannot attribute a quality to itself such as, 'white skin' or 'green eyes' while at the same time observing its white skin or green eyes. This would be tantamount to stating that 'my white skin' is observing 'my white skin'. In order for the subject to remain the subject it cannot assume observable qualities, such as colour, taste, emotions, beliefs, size, location, etc. Once an observable quality has been assigned to the subject, the subject then becomes an object which is observable to itself: an impossibility since this would require one subject which is the object and a second subject looking at the first while simultaneously being the first. It is true that common sense generally finds this acceptable with regards to other persons (e.g.,'he is white'). However, the contradiction becomes obvious when a quality is assigned to the self that is assigning it. When the 'I'- subject is turned into an 'I'-object, who then is the subject observing the object that 'I am'? Such a conundrum invites an infinite regression of witnessing subjects. In order to avoid this logical impasse nothing empirical can be attributed to the original subject, which must remain qualityless.

Shankara makes a clear distinction between the ego and the subject. The ego is a creation of the internal organ (mind), which involves memory, intellect, emotion, desire and conditioning and it stands as an object in relation to the subject. He notes that human beings associate the ego with the self and, by extension, mistakenly associate this self with the subject. He points out that if the self is equated with the ego, then the self cannot be the subject.

Step by step, Shankara establishes that the subject is neither the ego nor the self nor the body nor the internal organ (mind). Through relentless analysis, he pushes us up against the question: "What is this 'subject' which knows, observes and witnesses all these gross and subtle phenomena: the self, the ego, thoughts, memories, feelings, urges, sensations, bodies, people, landscapes, planets, stars, the universe?" If the subject itself can never be observed or measured, then does it really exist? Is the subject real or is it merely a fiction? Or, if it does exist, is it simply not verifiable in the ways humans normally verify something? Is it a reality which cannot be tested through our normal channels of investigation: observation, analysis, deduction, inference, and the independent corroboration of others?

Having identified the virus at the root of the disease, Shankara was able to identify and prescribe the cure. Travelling the length and breadth of India this remarkable man discoursed and debated with the greatest philosophers and gurus of the land. The result was the profound spiritual regeneration of an ancient civilization. Shankara's genius has not dimmed with the passage of time and those who study his writings today are impressed by the depth, precision and originality of his thinking.

Philosophically, Shankara was not a skeptic, yet an important aspect of his genius was his ability to take the position of the skeptic. Shankara respected healthy skeptism, but was himself a master of the highest and oldest school of yoga, the 'yoga of knowledge' (jnana yoga).